Voluntold: tactics in U.S. Army enlisted recruitment by Houghton, Helen Grace
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2020





GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES 
Thesis 
VOLUNTOLD: TACTICS IN  
U.S. ARMY ENLISTED RECRUITMENT 
by 
HELEN GRACE HOUGHTON 
      B.A., Boston University, 2020
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
2020 
©    2020 by 
       HELEN GRACE HOUGHTON
       All rights reserved 
Approved by 
First Reader 
David M. Glick, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
Second Reader 
Dino P. Christenson, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
iv 
DEDICATION 
I would like to dedicate this work to my partner Lee-Or and, most of all, my cat Lucy. 
None of this could have happened without them both.  
v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This thesis is the culmination of a lifetime’s worth of experiences and curiosities. For that 
I thank my parents for the life and the encouragement of the curiosities and my siblings 
for being there for the whole thing. I would like to specifically thank Bear Houghton-
Brady and Tessa Houghton for sharing this moment with me. Additional thanks is owed 
to my roommate, Elena Bernstein, and my friend, Brady Wright, for enduring my 
constant rambling and my partner, Lee-Or Bentovim, for even more of the same. Finally, 
I thank Professor David Glick for taking a chance on me and Representative John Moss 
for his work on the Freedom of Information Act which, despite all its faults, was essential 
to my work.  
vi 
VOLUNTOLD: TACTICS IN 
U.S. ARMY ENLISTED RECRUITMENT 
HELEN GRACE HOUGHTON 
ABSTRACT 
The maintenance of the size and strength of the U.S. volunteer military heavily 
depends on its recruitment arm to prospect and inform potential recruits. In a country 
where military service is believed to offer benefits such as steady incomes and college 
education to disadvantaged communities while implying they are unavailable through 
other means the concern becomes that recruiters target these communities for 
recruitment. This thesis first draws on the existing literature about citizen-state 
interactions to derive a new theoretical perspective about predatory practices then begins 
to evaluate that theory through a qualitative analysis of military recruitment manuals. The 
findings suggest that predatory practices may be occurring at lower levels of the 
recruitment hierarchy and those in charge are aware and unable or unwilling to prevent it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Former Presidential Candidate and Mayor of South Bend, Indiana Pete Buttigieg, 
in an interview with the New York Times, described the moment he decided to join the 
military as based off an experience he had volunteering for then presidential candidate 
Senator Barack Obama with a friend. Mayor Buttigieg describes how the campaign “sent 
us to this very rural area, some of the lowest income counties in Iowa” and, not meeting 
anyone their age, and, if they did, “it felt like any time I met a young — especially young 
man — it was somebody who was serving or was about to serve” (New York Times). 
This experience, to Buttigieg, forced an understanding that the traditional narrative of the 
military as “something that bridged people together” was “completely different, that if 
you were rural or low-income, you were highly likely to serve. If you were from a 
background like mine, which was middle class economically, but I’d had the chance to go 
to an institution like Harvard, almost nobody with that background was serving” (NYT). 
He then describes coming to terms with the problem and his fear that he “was part of the 
problem. I was part of the divide” (NYT).  
The divide Mayor Buttigieg perceived is one often mentioned among military 
members, but little discussed among political science and military scholars. The United 
States military is premised on the idea that it is volunteer based. As the volunteer-based 
nature of the military takes away organizational control, recruitment efforts are important 
to help maintain the size and strength of our military (Myers 2019). With that comes the 
concept of persuasion: is it volunteering if you have to be convinced? In the context of 
this dynamic comes the changing face of the United States military, particularly in the 
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case of enlisted forces. Enlisted soldiers have become increasingly demographically 
diverse, as is the U.S. population generally, but some racial groups, particularly African 
Americans and Latino Americans, have become overrepresented (DOD Demographics 
Report). Historically, some of these groups have disproportionately been targets of 
recruitment efforts (Butler and Moskos 2001). Joining the military brings with it social 
and economic benefits, particularly a stable income, a chance to travel outside one’s 
hometown, and educational benefits, and, when presented as the only way to achieve 
these benefits, some feel pressured into joining for fear of lack of opportunities 
elsewhere. Further benefits such as scholarships, job training, guaranteed college, and 
good housing might otherwise be hard to come by, but citizens should be concerned if the 
only people signing up are the ones that need the benefits. Inherent in this is the belief 
that these kids need the military, but also that the military needs these kids to go fight and 
possibly die. If the state is choosing a select population for this risk, by presenting the 
military option to them at higher rates compared to other groups, they are also choosing 
who dies, which comes with civil rights concerns. Being poor already decreases one’s life 
expectancy because of limited access to healthcare, housing, meals, and increased risk of 
going to prison; does society want poverty to mean a person is also more likely to die far 
from home in war? According to this reasoning, communities of color and poor families 
are the ones who must face the implications of foreign intervention for the United States, 
not the predominantly White congressmen and their constituents who supported it. 
Stories like Mayor Buttigieg’s beg the question: as the demographics of the 
military change, do they change for the right reasons? Is the military changing 
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demographically as a reflection of the changing American demographics, or is there an 
alternative explanation? The United States has a record of manipulating and taking 
advantage of communities of color. Is the military the most recently studied iteration of 
this dynamic? I investigate these questions and use them to extrapolate broader themes 
about what the military is selling itself to be. My research is intended to focus on the 
phenomena of how these changes come into effect, particularly focusing on the role of 
recruitment tactics in individual’s decisions to join the military. I argue that the changing 
demographics of the military are not occurring naturally but rather are due to or 
influenced by recruitment tactics. Through the work presented in this thesis, I seek to 
elaborate and test the hypothesis that military recruitment tactics disproportionately target 
and exploit economically disadvantaged and minority communities because of pressure to 
fulfill recruitment quotas by first developing a new theoretical perspective about 
recruitment and then seeking preliminary evidence to test that theory using analysis of 
military recruitment manuals. The exploitation of these groups has helped cause the 
changing demographics in the military in recent years. While this paper focuses directly 
on the recruitment issue, I pull from the broader literature regarding state interactions 
with its citizenry to construct theory about why the military is changing and the role of 
the state in that change.  
4 
Literature 
The varying theoretical views of state-citizen interactions influence the resulting 
views of military-citizen interactions, which is definitionally an arm and extension of the 
state. The literature discussed in this paper primarily deals with the predation state-
contract state dilemma. Simply put, there are two ways to view government interactions 
with the governed: through the lens of the predation state where the state is attempting 
the extract resources from the citizens and uses force and coercion to create legitimacy, 
or through the lens of the contract state where the state and the citizens form a mutually 
beneficial agreement and work together towards collective aims. The lens through which 
interactions are viewed shapes both the intentions of the state and the conception of who 
is supposed to benefit from any specific action.  
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RECRUITMENT AS PREDATION 
The phrase “volunteer force” does not convey how people are convinced to 
volunteer. People join the military for a variety of reasons: duty, prestige, family 
connections, a sense of adventure, or personal advancement, to name a few. But these 
factors have not changed over the last several decades. What has changed is the face of 
the US military force. Segal et al. in their 1999 article discuss temporal changes is US 
eighth through twelfth grader’s propensity to serve in the military between 1976 and 
1997. They find decreases in the percentage saying they will serve and stark increases in 
the percentages saying they definitely will not serve over the period studied. They also 
find variation by gender, race, and college plans. Women on average want to and say they 
will serve at significantly lower rates than men, but more interestingly have a higher rate 
of students saying they want to serve over saying they will serve. The authors 
hypothesize this has to do with the labor environment of the military, which they 
categorized as “poor,” referring to general labor conditions and worker satisfaction for 
most of the period studied and highlight it may be worse for women in particular because 
of the “masculine” culture of the military (Segal et al. 418). They also found distinct 
differences in the propensity to serve along racial lines. “African Americans,” they say, 
“have been overrepresented in the volunteer force relative to their proportion in the US 
population” and they find a more direct effect of the military's personnel policies than by 
“the increasing proportion of the population that is Black” (Segal et al. 418). They do not 
observe the same effect for Hispanic Americans, who are a growing proportion of the 
labor force but underrepresented in the military. White Americans have the lowest 
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propensity to serve, and it is more closely related to expectations of service within 
communities than any other external factor. This speaks directly to the idea of the warrior 
caste, which postulates that family and community ties can influence propensity to 
service and further develops this theory by postulating that it is a phenomenon only 
observed for White Americans. Segal et al then discuss the effect of educational 
aspirations and say that students who aspire to higher education and are “at higher mental 
aptitudes” are less likely to join, despite the military recognizing the need for recruits of 
these higher aptitudes and are thus in competition with the labor force for entry level 
positions and in competition with colleges and universities for the “best” recruits (Segal 
et al 422). Because of this competition, the military is trying to capitalize on the rising 
cost of college by using benefits such as the GI Bill and ROTC scholarships to entice 
“better” and college educated recruits. However, these benefits are likeliest to affect the 
officer class, as they are likely to have or need to have a college background. Across all 
groups of students, propensity to enlist was tied to the recruiting environment and 
expectations of benefits. When groups have higher expectations to serve than desires to 
serve, such as with African American and Hispanic men, “people in these groups 
perceive that the military will provide them with opportunities not available in the 
civilian labor force” while people in groups who have higher desire than expectation to 
serve, like women across all races and Hispanic men, “would like to serve, but perceive 
obstacles to doing so (and/or have more compelling reasons for choosing an alternative 
course)” (Segal et al 416). With this information, the military could more effectively 
target groups to increase their enlistment by highlighting the benefits, for groups with 
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high expectations, or downplaying the costs, for groups with high desires. Segal et al 
highlights the differences in expectations and desire rates as a key mechanism in the 
variability of enlistment rates in population subsets. However, because specific subsets of 
people fall within these groups, these people themselves become the target of differing 
recruitment efforts. Thus, these recruitment efforts become a factor in this differing 
enlistment levels.  
 The recruitment environment's effects on the propensity to serve is highlighted by 
Segal et al, and the enlistment environment has deteriorated in recent years. Segal again 
discusses this by mentioning how difficult recruiting is in expanding economies. The 
trend has been present in recent years, with the Army significantly underperforming its 
recruiting goal in 2018 and recruiters themselves feeling pressured to do better at any cost 
(Meyers 2019). Morale problems associated with failing recruitment goals can lead to 
latching on the perceived “easier targets,” those who would like to serve but may not be 
the best choices like those without high school degrees. This is a trend Segal discusses, 
saying that difficulties in recruiting in this environment have been reflected in lowering 
of recruiting goals and “substituting increased reenlistment for decrease recruiting, 
thereby aging the force, and in a lowering of enlistment standards at the margins, e.g. 
increasing the number of non-high school graduates accepted for the services” (Segal et 
al 423). This lowered standard of recruitment is an effect perceived, if not actually 
present, in the military. Mark Perry discusses in a 2018 article in The American 
Conservative, that “the problem, it seems, isn’t that young people don’t want to join the 
Army—or any of the services—it’s that they can’t,” because “while the U.S. military 
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represents the best in America (as its most senior officers claim), it doesn’t actually 
represent America. For that to be true, two thirds of our military would have to consist of 
obese, under-educated former drug users and convicted criminals” which it, to him, 
obviously cannot (Perry 2018). In Perry’s argument, this translates to: “one in three 
potential recruits are disqualified from service because they’re overweight, one in four 
cannot meet minimal educational standards (a high school diploma or GED equivalent), 
and one in 10 have a criminal history. In plain terms, about 71 percent of 18-to-24-year-
olds (the military’s target pool of potential recruits) are disqualified from the minute they 
enter a recruiting station” (Perry 2018). In an attempt to boost recruiting numbers after 
the failures of the past several years, the military could “lower their eligibility 
requirements, assign more recruiters to focus on target populations, lower the numbers of 
military members the armed forces needs” (Perry 2018). The first is unfeasible and 
undesirable given that would degrade the overall quality of the military despite some 
evidence that this is happening (Hsu et al 2007), and the last is controlled by external 
factors, leaving targeting and expanded recruitment strategies as the only viable option. 
Meyers also mentions this, and says to avoid this the military is going to shift its focus 
from “mainstay Southern and Midwestern towns,” where recruitment was traditionally 
highest “toward large, highly populated urban areas” (Meyers 2019). Both potentially 
targeted groups in Meyer’s analysis, non-high school graduates and people in urban 
areas, are more likely to be minorities and lower-income. Key to both the Meyers and 
Perry analysis is the need for more specific targeting of populations who are more likely 
to enlist. There is evidence to suggest this is already occurring. RAND Corporation has 
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suggested that the military use Big Data to “be able to use niche targeting” while 
additionally having to “target impediments to using third-party data and personally 
identifiable information” in their broader legal strategies (Lim et al 2019). Other studies 
have said that effective recruiters and managers need to “exploit opportunities to better 
target the Army's outreach and recruiting resources in different market segments, 
including varied geographic areas, older recruits, college market recruits, and other 
demographics” (Asch 2019). These targeting mechanism can be particularly effective for 
helping recruiters reach their recruitment goals. 
 However, targeting can become problematic very quickly, especially given 
recruiters’ incentives to increase numbers of recruits at any cost. Recruiters can receive 
bonuses for achieving their targets, often in the form of paid vacation days, as monetary 
incentives are not allowed by law, promotion or recommendation for promotion, and 
awards and recognition such as badges, rings, and stars. While the illegality of monetary 
incentives shows that the military recognizes that incentive structures can cause 
inappropriate recruiter behavior, any incentive is still an incentive, these are fairly serious 
and big incentives, and recent scholars have suggested increasing incentives to help 
promote recruitment (Asch 2019). Even without these incentives, recruiters have been 
known to behave inappropriately or against regulation to get recruits to sign on. The 
military runs a recruitment abuse hotline to attempt to identify and sanction problematic 
recruiters, but such information is confidential and not accessible. A non-profit 
organization called GI Rights Hotline runs an independent complaint database, which is 
also confidential, but were able to provide a list of common complaints upon my request. 
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They cite the top complaint among recruits to be that recruiters will promise new 
enlistees assignments, which they cannot do and have no control over whatsoever. Next, 
they say that recruiters have a tendency to tell enlistees to lie or not report past issues on 
their background forms, including serious issues such as medical histories, mental health 
issues, and criminal backgrounds. Lastly, they say recruiters will make it intentionally 
difficult to change your mind mid-way through the recruitment process and tell the 
recruit that it is either too late, which is untrue, or pressure them into continuing. 
Complaints such as these must be taken with a grain of salt as the organization did not 
provide numbers or specifics, but are incredibly serious and cannot be taken lightly. If 
people are being forced to join or forced to lie about things that would make them 
ineligible to join the military, can the US claim its force is truly all-volunteer? 
 I theorize that such examples of problems within the recruiting structure speak to 
a broader literature regarding state acts against their own citizens. A prominent example 
would be Page and Soss’s discussion of the “Predation State,” where “conceptions of the 
state begin from a conflict perspective,” as opposed to contract state theory where the 
state is based on consent (Page and Soss 141). Predation states views highlight the role 
monetary incentives play in governance, particularly highlighting that states view their 
citizens are sources of resources, which exist to be extracted from. Predation state 
systems first create “expropriative projects and a structural disposition to serve the 
interests of capital growth and investment (on which tax revenues depend)” based off of a 
need for those revenues. They then shape state action in ways that “entrench and protect 
them [the ruling or dominant class] at the expense of subordinate groups” and create a 
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system in which state practices distinguish and empower members of the dominant strata 
as the ‘real citizens’ who are set apart by the civic exclusion and subordination of other 
groups” (Page and Soss 141). They cite example of the predation state in action in 
Ferguson specifically, but it is not difficult to extrapolate outward. They discuss the ways 
in which the Ferguson example is not unique in US history; “Race-, class-, and gender-
targeted predation has been a central and enduring theme in American state and nation 
building, in the structure of our political economically, and in the varied forms of social 
domination that define American life,” which is often misunderstood and 
mischaracterized because “predatory strategies for extracting resources from subjugated 
communities shift over time, generally reflecting the broader political rationalities of their 
era,” functioning as “an essential but poorly understood element of neoliberal 
governance” (Page and Soss 140). Fines and fees are not punishment for wrongdoing, 
particularly when they are used primarily in poor, minority neighborhoods such as in 
Ferguson, but an essential part of the financial extraction element of the state, which it 
utilizes most effectively by preying on the most vulnerable members of society. But the 
predation state is more than this. “Predation is more than just a repressive taking of 
freedoms and resources from subordinated groups. It is also a productive force that 
constructs power relations, subject positions, and terms of civic standing. Among other 
things, it produces what we call the ‘indentured citizen,’” shaping the power and social 
dynamics of society and restructure what it means to be in that society (Page and Soss 
140). It is also important to note, as the authors do, that contract state and predation state 
are not fundamental opposites but exist in tandem. “The prevailing terms of social 
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contract may presume predation and be organized around the reproduction and 
advancement of domination,” (Page and Soss 142) such as with the protection of the 
institution of slavery in the American constitution, and the entrenchment of the power of 
smaller, Whiter states. Even in such mixed states, predation is at the heart of and is 
embedded in every action. “The entwining of predatory and contractual practices is an 
abiding theme in the history of American political and economic development” 
particularly exemplified in that the “‘growth of a prosperous, liberal democratic society 
of Anglo Americans’ was made possible by ‘a predatory state that financed White liberal 
society through its ruthless exploitation of Indian lands and African American Labor’” 
(Page and Soss 142) which was done explicitly and as a fundamental act of the 
establishment of the America we know today.  
Predation in America is not a bygone of the past to be lamented over but moved 
on from nor a problem created by individuals in the modern era, but an inherent and 
enduring aspect of the American state. Inequality and domination is built into our system 
and is a part of every aspect of society. Predatory lending practices were legal in the 
United States until the 1960s and still exist in many forms today, such as offering higher 
interest rates to people deemed “risks” or who seem unlikely to pay back loans. Redlining 
and unequal access to house loans and mortgage insurance was also legal until the 60s 
and the effects of such practices have never been adequately addressed. Recent 
scholarship has looked into the “justice gap,” or unequal application of justice and legal 
standards to lower income and minority Americans. The Legal Services Corporation’s 
2017 report on the justice gap found stark differences between the lives of low income 
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and high income Americans in terms of legal justice, including the finding that in the past 
year, 71% of low-income households experienced at least one civil legal problem such as 
problems with health care, housing conditions, disability access, veterans’ benefits, and 
domestic violence and 86% of the civil legal problems reported by low-income 
Americans received inadequate or no legal help (LSC 2017). Such inequalities are not 
unknown to the broader academic world nor are they particularly new. The American 
Constitution Society’s 2015 conference at Yale Law School, entitled “Law and 
Inequality,” delved into the very structures in our legal codes that create and perpetuate 
inequality. National Affairs has an article in their Fall 2019 issue number 51 which 
discusses “Justice, Inequality, and the Poor.”  
But this is it. Academia may be aware of such issues and conscious of predatory 
state theories, but not much is done about it or to make this more publicly known. As 
referenced in the National Affairs piece, “efforts to address poverty in America are 
frequently derailed by misguided ideology,” an assertion which questions the feasibility 
of redistributive policies and the idea that equality and justice are linked (Messmore 
2019). Hanna Pitkin discusses a possible reason why in her 1966 paper “Obligation and 
Consent” as being a factor of the way citizens see the role of our government. She 
discusses our very idea of what citizens feel obligated to do as a factor of the way the 
idea of government presents itself in our minds. The philosophy citizens learn and our 
founding documents instill in us a sense of obligation to obey, which “teaches that your 
obligation depends not on any actual act of consenting, past or present, by yourself or 
your fellow-citizens, but on the character of the government. If it is a good, just 
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government doing what a government should, then you must obey it; if it is a tyrannical, 
unjust government trying to do what no government may, then you have no such 
obligation” (Pitkin 1966). Democratic ideals cannot be tyrannical compared to the 
tyranny that existed before, and thus citizens do not feel the lack of obligation to obey 
and view inequality as not inherent to the system but an accidental feature of it, because 
of the historical memory of tyranny and the American narrative presented by the elite 
who seek to benefit from obedience. As such, inequality and poverty can be written off as 
not anyone or anything in particular’s fault but just phenomena that occur, independent of 
all else. Thus, the narrative that “poor people join the military” as seen in Buttigieg’s 
story does not come across as problematic to many. The government is not seen as 
shifting the burden of fighting, suffering, and dying for an American system that does not 
benefit them from the upper class elite to those most in need, but as an opportunity for 
those who did not get pay and educational benefits elsewhere to advance themselves. Just 
because this dynamic is not currently seen as a problem does not mean that it is not one.  
Through the lens of the predation state, recruitment is the extraction of manpower 
and labor resources from the general population in order to prop up and maintain the 
existing state infrastructure and power. The state will do that through the easiest means 
possible, to not waste more resources, which means going after those most vulnerable to 
convince them to join, through the strategic and intention targeting of these populations 
and the presentation of the military as the best or the only option for advancement. I 
hypothesize that changes in military demographics come from predation state interactions 
with the public through predatory recruiting. By predatory, I mean the intentional 
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targeting of vulnerable minority and economically disadvantaged groups, as opposed to 
general recruiting where no groups are specifically targeted. The distinction becomes 





THE MILITARY AS AN ARM OF THE CONTRACT STATE  
However, in a world in which the government is truly by the people and for the 
people, these changes in demographics could be attributed to the regular, benign 
processes resulting from the changing demographics of the United States and the labor 
force. Contract Theory is premised on a state that is a result of an informed contract with 
its citizens and thus institutionally designed to service and protect them. Our own 
Declaration of Independence begins with a statement of this belief: “Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed” (USA 
1776, emphasis added). Similarly, the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights Article 21 states that "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government," from which there can be no compromise and no debate. Both these 
documents are influenced by the writings of contract theorists from the Age of 
Enlightenment, particularly those of British Philosopher John Locke, who outlines these 
theories in his Second Treatise of Government, and tries to convince his government that 
its power lies “in the consent of the people, which being the only one of all lawful 
governments” (Locke 2). In a world in which governing power derives from consent, 
citizenship is a form of contract, one which you voluntarily enter, and interactions with 
the state are then framed in those terms. You are arrested because you have violated the 
terms of your contract in which you have agreed to obey the laws the government you 
consented to has created. Getting a job in the government is another secondary contract, 
in which you provide services for compensation. Joshua Page and Joe Soss discuss 
contract theory’s place in the US context as supplying the liberal-democratic framework 
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for most studies of the US government. They contrast its functions in civil versus 
economic spheres, highlighting that contract government seeks to preserve “liberal 
equalities of democratic citizenship,” on one side, and “the liberal inequalities of market 
economies, on the other” (Page and Soss 141). Inequality was the cost of civilization, and 
civilization required sacrifices, whether it be in the form of taxes, constraints on freedom, 
or service to one’s country. 
Despite the need for some to sacrifice, military sacrifice has typically been done 
on a volunteer basis. Conscriptions during the Civil War, World Wars, and Vietnam era 
being exceptions to the norm, the US military prides itself on its volunteer status. Despite 
economic concerns and concerns over immediate force readiness for full scale 
deployment, Warner and Asch outline the case for an all-volunteer force in that it 
increases recruit quality and morale, as well as overall military legitimacy (Warner and 
Asch 2001). However, an all-volunteer force and the particular lifestyle of military 
servicemen allows for certain subsets of the population to volunteer more than others. A 
widely documented phenomenon is that of the “military caste.” Particularly present in 
officer ranks as opposed to enlisted, a smaller and smaller group of the population is 
joining the military, and it is often confined to specific families and communities. Pew 
Research Data concludes that, for Americans aged 18 to 29, 33% have family in the 
military, compared to 79% of those aged 50 to 64, while veterans are more likely to have 
family members who are also serving, particularly siblings and children. Veterans are 
more than twice as likely than members of the general public to say they have a child 
who has served, at 21% versus 9%. Meanwhile members of the public are more likely 
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than veterans to say they have a grandparent who served in the military at 51% versus 
37%. An increasingly smaller population of people can say they are related to service 
members, while service members themselves are becoming more likely to be related to 
other service members (Pew). One particularly salient example of this phenomena is 
General John Kelly, who became the highest ranking military officer to lose a child in 
combat when his son Robert was killed by a landmine in Afghanistan in 2010, while his 
other son John was and is currently also serving as an active-duty Marine. The 
Washington Post article describing the event even seeks to highlight the uniqueness of 
the event, stating that “He [General Kelly] was giving voice to a growing concern among 
soldiers and Marines: the American public is largely unaware of the price its military 
pays to fight the United States' distant conflicts. Less than 1 percent of the population 
serves in uniform at a time when the country is engaged in one of the longest periods of 
sustained combat in its history” (Jaffe). The creation of a “warrior caste” creates a 
growing isolation of the military apparatus from civilian life. 
In other ways, the military can actually be seen as a societal equalizer. 
Theoretically at least, soldiers enter and advance according to the same criteria, 
regardless of race, class, or gender. In a segregated, discriminatory America, the military 
offered African Americans and other marginalized groups opportunities unavailable 
anywhere else for consistent pay, job training, and prestige. African Americans have been 
fighting in the military, albeit often in segregated regiments, since the Revolutionary 
War, and the military was one of the first organizations to mandate racial desegregation 
with Executive Order 9981 signed by President Truman. By 1958, the military was fully 
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desegregated and had established itself on the basis of equality of opportunity for all, far 
outpacing any sector of US society, which was just beginning the struggle against racial 
injustice. Colin Powell, reflecting on his time in the military, stated “I was in a profession 
that would allow me to go as far as my talents would take me. And for a Black, no other 
avenue in American society offered so much opportunity” (Powell). This is in many ways 
beneficial to the military itself. With the introduction of the all-volunteer force in 1973, a 
fully integrated and equal-opportunity military made it easier to recruit and retain 
soldiers. The military is by no means entirely equal, but the strict structure and focus on 
following orders allowed for marginalized groups to advance.  
The picture painted through this literature is of a force both diversifying but also 
becoming more isolated, neither of which are occurring intentionally. As the nature of the 
US labor force and needs of the military change, demographics change with them through 
patterns of enlistment independent of specific recruitment tactics. However, the military 
would not waste resources on recruitment if they felt it was not useful and would 
similarly not spend time calculating the best place to send recruiters if specific types of 
places didn’t have varying recruitment rates. The existence of a recruitment arm at all 
thus implies the story is more complicated than simple contract theory would suggest. 
The volunteer force and recruitment plays an important role in this dynamic, but to what 
extent and in what way is still debated. 
As seen through the lens of the contract state-predatory state dynamic, predatory 
state theory suggests that no action pushed by the government, even one done 
“consensually,” is without some predatory influence, including military enlistment. The 
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volunteer nature of the military creates problems in enlistment numbers, which then 
creates the need for targeting populations more likely to join including lower-income 
Americans and minorities, which then accounts for the demographic changes in the 
military towards being more socio-economically and racially diverse. The American state 
is, in this theory, predatory, both currently and historically, which serves to compound 
issues of structural inequality, and potentially makes certain people both the targets of, 
and more vulnerable to, the predatory recruitment practices used by the United States 
military. Further analysis could provide evidence for this theory and enable me to make 
more concrete claims about the US Army’s interactions with civilian populations and, if 
my theory was supported, would paint a dark of the United States enlistment system. I 





Direct understanding of the relation between the US military’s recruitment 
practices and the diversification of the military would require insight into the inner 
workings of the military enlistment structure, which because of the nature of the military 
is not feasible. The government and military operations rely on a level of secrecy which 
prevents such analysis. As such, I employ a qualitative study of military recruitment 
manuals, the guides provided to recruiters on best practices and tactics. These manuals 
are first-hand accounts of how soldiers are supposed to behave, who is allowed to join, 
and what to do when behaviors deviate from the norm, and thus limited in that they only 
detail normal behavior. Complaints and criticisms of recruiter practices through official 
channels are confidential and inaccessible to the public, and complaints posted elsewhere 
either on online forums or social media are rare and unreliable. Thus these manuals 
provide our best look into the structure of recruitment and can be tempered by taking into 
account common complaints. I also choose to focus specifically on the US Army, the 
largest and most diverse branch, to narrow the scope while also testing the theory in the 
context where the effects seem to be most visible. As a supplement, data will be included 
about where recruiters are sent, to look for patterns that may indicate the targeting of 
specific populations. I choose to define coercion broadly, because of the high standard 
which citizens apply to the military and that the military applies to itself. Coercion is 
defined as the strategic presentation of options as the “only” option or the “best” option 
without clear evidence. I also include pressure and consistent follow ups in this category, 
particularly if they are directed towards people in a particular group. Persuasion is thus 
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differentiated from coercion in that coercion is persistent attempts at persuasion, or half-
truths in an attempt at persuasion; coercion is persuasion that differs from the acceptable 
or the allowable. In particular, I am looking for language about the “types” of people 
recruiters are seeking, how they attempt to entice them to join, and specific things 
recruiters are told “not to do” as they are indicative of persistent problematic behaviors 
the military is seeking to stop but has yet to entirely.  
Through this analysis, I seek evidence about specific subsets of people who are 
pressured to join the military because of recruiter tactics. While this may be a difficult 
route to use to understand this phenomena, the nature of the military prevents more direct 
methods of observation and the phenomena is too important to be ignored. There is a 
common belief, particularly regarding enlisted soldiers, that they join because of a lack of 
alternative opportunities. This in and of itself is not legally problematic. This practice 
becomes a problem when groups of people who are perceived as not having opportunities 
become the targets of recruiters. The limitation of opportunities to already systematically 
limited populations and presentation of enlistment as the only available option, while 
minimizing the risks associated with that opportunity, is borderline dishonest. If the US is 
lying to its citizens to convince them to join the military, is it truly a volunteer army? Is it 
right that the United States prides itself on the power of the volunteer force and our lack 
of mandatory conscription while coercing its citizens to fight and possibly die? While this 
analysis leads to more questions than answers, it still seeks to defend or refute the 
narrative of the military as the “career of last resort” and question assumptions at the 
heart of the American ethos.  
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ANALYSIS 
Through my Freedom of Information Act request, I was able to identify a number 
of documents which recorded and were related to the enlistment process and was able to 
analyze several to test my theory. Despite numerous issues and hindrances,1 three 
specific documents I obtained were used to shed light on the systems in place for 
selecting and placing recruiters into the field. In general, these documents revealed three 
main points: the recruiter selection system is easy to get placed into but difficult to get 
removed from, the selection system preferences recruiters who are single and from 
affluent backgrounds, recruitment is as much about image repair as it is about persuasion, 
and the systems in place to address grievances and issues do not adequately protect those 
being recruited.  
The first document included in this analysis is Army Regulation 601–1 Personnel 
Procurement Assignment of Enlisted Personnel to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command 
(USAREC), which is a 142-page document outlining the criteria and procedures for 
assignment to recruiting command. Put succinctly, for an enlisted soldier to become a 
recruiter, “recruiters will volunteer or be nominated by career branches,” or in cases of 
shortages of volunteers or nominees, “be selected by HRC [Human Resources 
Command]” at random to serve “either as Army recruiters or as administrative support” 
(AR601-1, 4). USAREC defines their ideal recruiter as someone able to “represent the 
Army in civilian communities,” and thus must have “high moral character, emotional and 
financial stability, outstanding personal appearance and bearing, and a favorable record 
1 See Appendix 
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of service in previous assignments” (AR601-1, 4). While on their face, these criteria seem 
straightforward and reasonable, the way they are defined and implemented becomes an 
issue. The criteria below are different from and in addition to the criteria for becoming a 
soldier. The process and criteria for becoming a recruiter favors specific types of 
individuals, many of whom are not the same types of people as the ones being targeted 
for recruitment. 
Soldiers that are assigned to become recruiters “will be detailed to USAREC for a 
3-year stabilized assignment,” (AR601-1, 4) with options reassignment for one year 
increments which means they will not be required to move or change duty station during 
that three years, which is a significant period of time particularly for enlisted soldiers 
who are required to change duty stations frequently. Because of this relative stability, 
becoming a recruiter might seem appealing to those soldiers with families, either single 
parents or with a spouse, but soldiers with children are discouraged from volunteering 
and less likely to be selected, as recruiters are required to be “not be pregnant at time of 
selection” and “if it is discovered that the Soldier is pregnant or becomes pregnant while 
attending the ARC, Soldier will be withdrawn from the ARC [Army Recruiting 
Command] and returned to parent unit” (AR601-1, 5). Additionally, recruiters who are 
married to other soldiers must have their spouse apply for recruitment command as well 
and soldiers who have “custody (dual or sole custody) of minor age dependents” are 
required to get a “sole parent waiver” from the Commanding General of USAREC and 
are not eligible to for reassignment into USAREC (AR601-1, 5). These specific 
requirements, which are not directly tied to a recruiters ability to perform their mission or 
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to any of the characteristic of the ideal recruiter and significantly more strict than the 
requirements for standard enlistment soldiers, have the effect of both disincentivizing 
women from becoming recruiters, because of the fear of becoming pregnant and losing 
your assignment, and of disincentivizing soldiers with spouses or children, who would 
most benefit from the stability of the assignment. The strategic curating of the potential 
applicant pool becomes alarmingly evident just from this first requirement. 
Additional barriers to entry in recruiting further limit the population that can become 
recruiters. A primary example of this is the prohibition on tattoos. Tattoos were 
prohibited in the military at large until very recently, and even now tattoos cannot have 
specific themes or be in specific locations. For recruiters, there are still significant 
restrictions in place, with every potential recruiter being required to submit “photographs 
of all of their tattoos,” barring those in sensitive areas, for documentation and review 
(AR601-1, 7). Given that in the United States, those with tattoos are disproportionately 
likely to be people of color (Ipsos 2019), this restriction, if applied stringently, could 
have the effect of excluding people of color from the recruitment pool. This is also a 
restriction with which the officer reviewing the application has a lot of discretion in 
deciding who passes and who fails, which again could be used to curate the pool of 
applicants further. Criteria of this type include any that require a waiver, like the parental 
custody restrictions mentioned earlier, but also any of a list of “Type II” offenses which 
include things such as “drunkenness,” “fraud against the United States,” “adultery,” and 
having a “currently revoked, denied, or suspended security clearance” (AR601-1, 8). Of 
these, only one, fraud, has a legal definition and yet all of which can cause a soldier to be 
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denied without full justification and with the reviewing officer’s complete discretion. It is 
easy to see how a standard such as “drunkenness” can be applied to a soldier for no 
apparent reason and the soldier must then be required to either prove the standard was 
wrongfully applied through appeal, forcing himself into a system which has deemed him 
unworthy and angering those in positions of authority, or to apply for and be granted a 
waiver, a lengthy process which could end in nothing at all. Similarly, soldiers are 
required to have “no record of emotional or mental instability” within six months of 
applying for the position, a standard which is again not defined or qualified, and is 
particularly hard to meet given the life of a soldier and their heightened rates of anxiety, 
depression, and PTSD. One negative mental health assessment, taken out of context, 
blown out of proportion, or even truthful but understandable given the soldier’s life 
circumstances, could negatively impact their career and future assignment prospects. Any 
soldier who thinks those above them might have a grudge or bias against them will be 
discouraged from applying for the position, knowing these criteria could be used against 
them to delay or hinder their assignment without any possibility of repercussion on the 
part of the reviewing officer, due to the level of discretion they are given in deciding who 
is fit for recruitment duty. In the same vein, recruiters are required to be “financially 
stable, have not filed a petition claiming bankruptcy within the last 3 years, and not 
currently responsible for making any payments as a result of any such action” (AR601-1, 
6). “In determining financial suitability,” the document continues, “consideration will 
include income versus expenditures, savings, and investment programs, and costs 
associated with being separated from military installations” (AR601-1, 6). Of particular 
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interest is the “costs associated with being separated from military institutions,” which 
presumes that USAREC knows that there are additional expenses associated with the 
positions but fails to sufficiently cover them. This, combined with the prohibition on 
having unsuitable finances, has the effect of preferencing soldiers from more privileged 
backgrounds, either as a result of previous work experiences or familial wealth, who are 
more likely to be able to afford the potential additional costs, more likely to have savings, 
and less likely to have debt. As, in the United States, wealth corresponds to race and 
socio-economic background, soldiers disqualified by this standard are disproportionately 
likely to be minorities or lower income brackets. Again, such restrictions are not applied 
to the regular enlistment force.  The curation of the perfect recruiter, a process distinct 
from the enlistment of soldiers, thus goes beyond choosing soldiers who can represent the 
army truthfully and honorably to choosing soldiers who have only had positive 
experiences and have faced no adversity, thus presenting a glossed over and idyllic 
version of being a soldier. These standards also chiefly apply to the applicant side. For 
soldiers who are chosen for assignment to USAREC, no standards or selection processes 
are disclosed, meaning those in command could and likely do choose soldiers who again 
have not faced any of the difficulties of the military system and have only positive things 
to say about their experience.  
 While this may seem obvious and a smart recruiting tactic, to only present the 
best of what the military has to offer, it is more than dishonest but again excludes specific 
populations from joining the recruitment force. The perfect recruiter becomes 
increasingly more white, male, and financially privileged than the average soldier, unlike 
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the populations which are being recruited from. These recruiters do not know the people 
they recruit from, and are more likely to succumb to negative stereotypes and beliefs 
about them, and are less likely to address or bring up specific concerns they may have. 
Preferencing white men at the expense of recruiters of color and women in this way 
excludes the information diverse recruiters may have about their experiences in the 
military, both positive and negative, and prevents potential recruits from being able to 
make sound, informed decisions and empowers recruiters to target using stereotypes 
about those recruits. Thus, the current standards for recruiters preferences a pool of 
recruiters that are more able and willing to target those unlike them, a breeding ground 
for the predatory practices of the predatory state.  
  Together AR601-1 and the two other documents further hint at a second dynamic: 
there are problems with recruiters, but the system is not good at finding and preventing 
those problems. A lot of the guidelines throughout the rest of the document are in and of 
themselves recognition that there’s a problem. For example, the limits of tour lengths for 
recruiters combined with restrictions on attending social gatherings is recognition that 
becoming too ingrained in a community can be problematic in that it gives you leverage 
to encourage people who would not normally enlist to do so in a community with strong 
social ties where people may feel inclined to defend each other against such practices. 
Army Directive 2016-17 (AD2016-17) provides a detailed outline of prohibited 
relationships between recruiters and community members or potential recruits. The 
document states that “Army policy prohibits inappropriate relations between recruiters 
and prospects, applicants, and/or recruits and between trainers providing entry-level 
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training and trainees” (AD2016-17, 3). These relationships and behaviors can include 
sexual relations, lending money or gambling, being together alone for extended periods 
of time, attending social gatherings with potential recruits, and having potential recruits 
visit the recruiters home. Violating these rules can result in reassignment, removal from 
recruitment assignment, removal from the army, and court martial, but each of these 
options present different issues. The processes are not explicitly laid out in AD2016-17, 
but are in AR601-1, which makes it clear that all of these steps are incredibly difficult. To 
be reassigned, the reassignment must be “based on valid requirements and sound 
justification” approved by Human Resources Command (AR601-1, 13). To be 
reassigned, there has to be a reason, meaning there must be a credible claim of 
misconduct made against the recruiter that warrants them having to be reassigned. Given 
the culture of the military, particularly in regards to claims of misconduct, this is a hard 
bar to pass. It's also not a perfect solution, as reassignment comes with no other 
repercussions and simply sends the recruiter off to do the same thing again someplace 
else. With that in mind, victims and higher ups might seek more serious sanctions, but 
that has even more problematic elements. How serious the sanction and punishment 
depends on the strength of the claims and evidence provided. For any actions to be taken, 
“description and evidence of specific incidents or acts must support these requests” for 
actions (AR601-1, 13), which may be impossible or nearly so to acquire. Then comes the 
process of filing and getting responses to claims and evidence, which involves significant 
paperwork and bureaucratic maneuvering. Because the whole process is subject to officer 
discretion, the claim could easily be dismissed as uncredible or the recruiter could be 
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moved before any action is done, and the claim swept under the rug. For any claim to 
result in actual repercussions, it would require continued pressure from victims or 
advocates, substantial evidence, and that the recruiter be early enough in his assignment 
to not leave command or be reassigned, all of which are difficult to achieve and not 
guaranteed to have positive results. There is also the additional concern that, after 
successful reprimand or removal, the recruiter could be reinstated either by appealing the 
decision or if those above him either do not believe the claims or do not believe them to 
be serious enough to warrant removal. “For cases of involuntary reassignment or 
reattachment,” such as removal from recruiting command, “authority is delegated by 
USAREC to each brigade commander to reinstate suspended recruiters to duty where 
investigated allegations or proposed bases for the involuntary reassignment or 
reattachment are adequately refuted by a preponderance of credible evidence” (AR601-1, 
19). On the surface, credible evidence seems like a fair standard, but “credible evidence 
may be based on a recruiter’s rebuttal or by other objective evidence provided through 
commanders in the chain of command” (AR601-1, 19) and thus simply saying the action 
did not occur and being believed can be enough to be fully reinstated. As AD2016-17 has 
been reissued every year, with some modification, since 2016, it can be concluded that 
the Army recognizes that there is a problem but is either not keen to, or unable to, make 
significant steps to amend the process of sanction. 
These documents combined illustrate that the processes allowing and encouraging 
targeting are in place and the Army is not in a position to properly prevent individual 
recruiters from doing so. With this in mind, the Army is put in a position of either 
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choosing to preempt and prevent these practice or allow them to continue. There is 
evidence to suggest that they are allowing it in the form of covering up such negative 
practices in the form of image repair and damage control. Army Regulation 601–2 
(AR601-2) Personnel Procurement Army Recruiting Support Programs describes 
practices of these sorts in the form of recruitment support programs which aim to 
improve the image of the recruitment mission. In particular, it seeks integration of 
recruiters and recruitment into “Centers of Influence” such as schools and community 
organizations which “bolster the Army’s image or help influence individuals who are 
considering Army service” and make recruiting a part of everyday life (AR601-2, 1). 
Programs such as base tours and placement of recruiters “high schools, trade schools, 
community colleges, colleges, universities, pre-med, healthcare professional career 
schools, and similar settings” help the army gain access to “primary recruiting audiences” 
and “improve the Army’s image through the use of promotional assets that increase 
awareness and interest in Army opportunities” (AR601-2, 3). They claim three specific 
objectives for the program:  
“to Provide tours of Army installations, medical treatment facilities, and activities 
for educators and other centers of influence; Pass the following messages to COI 
[Centers of Influence]: (1) Education and training opportunities in the Army are 
excellent, and Soldiers are encouraged to continue their education. (2) The Army 
is a choice that should be considered by every graduating high school senior and 
every healthcare student or professional. (3) The Army is genuinely interested in 
the welfare and development of its Soldiers. (4) Many students have limited 
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knowledge of Army opportunities. (5) The Army consists of competent, well-
trained, and proud multiskilled leaders who can perform critical functions from 
warfighting to statesmanship to business management; and Directly support the 
recruiting effort by seeking improved access to schools” (AR601-2, 5-6).  
Through tactics such as the determination of “targeted invitee group” and who will be 
“most likely to participate” the program further perpetuates the targeting practices they 
are trying to cover up while going after potential recruits where they are most vulnerable 
and persuadable through trusted figures such as “counselors, principals and school board 
members; presidents of professional organizations, deans of medical schools, and 
financial aid advisors” (AR601-2, 6). As such, the document not only reveals the extent 
to which the Army is concerned about their image, but that even that concern takes a 
backseat to the targeting and enlistment of recruits in whatever way they can.  
 While only a brief look into the expansive documentation related to recruiting, 
substantial evidence has been found that the dynamics at play in USAREC are at the very 
least problematic, if not directly predatory, and there is little the Army has done to 




The basic analysis provided here already lends evidence to the theoretical work 
presented. While my evidence is preliminary and thus inconclusive, there is reason to 
believe that, individual recruiters, in an attempt to meet recruiting quotas, are targeting 
individuals in places where they are most vulnerable.  
While such conclusions can only be loosely supported, evidence from additional 
sources and documents could provide a basis for stronger conclusions.  Additional 
sources, such as transcripts or documentation of conversations or guidelines about which 
specific students or individuals are best to target, discussions of standards of what makes 
a recruiter “effective,” and claims of difficulty in removing recruiters who have 
documented misbehaviors or harmful practices would provide ideal evidence of the 
theoretical practices outlined in this theses, but they may be impossible to obtain or 
outside of the scope of this work. In an analysis of additional documents, evidence such 
as information about recruitment quotas and incentives or punishments for recruiter 
performance, more training manuals that include guidelines for recruiters specifically, 
and records of complaints or interviews with recruits would help substantiate the theory 
that recruitment practices are predatory. Documents such as these are unclassified and 
could be made available with subsequent FOIA requests2. As such, a broader analysis of 
recruitment documents, based on these few documents analyzed, would provide more 
insight into the broader trends and practices of US Army Recruiting Command and the 
2 See appendix. 
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recruiters who work there and would be needed to make more insightful conclusions 
about the nature of military interactions with civilian populations.  
The documents here shed light on the internal processes regarding what types of 
people are able to become recruiters, patterns of behavior those individuals engage in, 
and the efforts the army goes to bolster its image in the communities it recruits from. 
Further analysis and in depth examination of similar documents could provide more 





A significant portion of the research in this thesis comes from documents and 
information gathered from Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. I have elected 
to document and discuss my process, in the hopes of clarifying the process for other 
beginning scholars and academics as well as justifying and clarifying decisions I took 
during the thesis writing process. 
The FOIA is a federal law that requires the partial or full disclosure of 
information and documentation in the possession of the United States government upon 
request. Passed in response to the civil unrest of the 1960s and 70s, the law was pushed 
most heavily by Representative John Moss from California’s 3rd District. Despite a time 
limit of twenty days for agencies to respond to FOIA requests, most agencies lack the 
capacity and funding to do so and as such a significant number of requests are delayed 
months and many resort to lawsuits to get their requests processed. Luckily, my request 
did not result in a lawsuit, but did take two months to get an initial response and an 
additional month to get an amended response, before later being held up by the closure of 
US Army Recruiting Command in light of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. While much 
of this was not in my control, I did learn some insights about how to make the process 
smoother and less drawn out.  
Before starting the application, I highly suggest checking FOIA reading rooms. 
Reading rooms are online archives of documents made publically available through 
FOIA and everything in them is immediately available. Doing so has the potential to save 
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you the time and hassle of completing a FOIA request, as well as avoiding the inevitable 
frustration the system creates. 
The single most important step of the process is the initial request submission. It 
is not entirely intuitive, so it is incredibly important to plan in advance. In doing so, you 
must choose which agency to file the request with. As there are innumerable agencies, 
this can be difficult at times, but choosing the correct agency can significantly speed up 
the rate of response because the process for an agency to transfer a request to another 
takes an extraordinary length of time. For example, my requests for military recruitment 
manuals was initially filed with TRADOC, US Army Training and Doctrine Command 
which is charged with overseeing training of Army forces and the development of 
operational doctrine as well as documentation related to it. As it turns out, this was the 
incorrect decision, as US Army Recruiting Command, as a result of an interagency 
dispute in the 90s, reserves the right to control and distribute their specific training 
documentation, a technicality I had never even considered nor heard of prior to filling out 
the request. My request was then bounced from TRADOC to USAREC, the results of 
which I have yet to see. By chance, a month after the initial response, I decided to call the 
person who sent me the initial response, which is when the officer informed me that it 
might be best to resubmit my initial request with USAREC, as agencies tend to process 
initial requests faster than bounced requests. This process emphasizes the importance of 
picking the correct agency, as well as the usefulness of reaching out once a response is 
given. Both here and at later steps of the process, I found it helpful to reach out for 
clarification and guidance and it was always insightful and useful.  
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The request form does not have many steps and takes very little time to fill out, 
but as such needs very careful attention paid to the wording. This may seem like an 
obvious point, but I highly suggest having others read your request and trying to describe 
to you the types of documents they think you’re looking for. It never hurts to be overly 
specific in these cases. Specificity will help those processing your request understand 
exactly what you’re looking for and more efficiently find and give it to you.  
The biggest thing to know about the FOIA process is that it’s all a waiting game, 
but it's important not to get lost in the game. If the process is taking a long time or there’s 
an initial response and no follow up, it is helpful to reach out. While a lot of the process 
is lengthy and bogged down with administrative and bureaucratic sub-processes, it is 
these people’s job to help and many are actually trying their best. This also applies to 
asking for clarification or assistance in navigating the documents and websites they send 
you. At no moment during this process did I feel like the individuals I was speaking to 
were not interested in helping me. 
All of this being said, my process was only partially finished. My process was 
long, but further hindered by the government response to the COVID-19 pandemic. As of 
the writing of this Appendix on April 6th, 2020, US Army Recruitment Command is 
closed and I have not been able to get responses to emails or calls. Furthermore, the 
website containing the documents included in my FOIA request has been down since 
mid-March and because my specific request is currently no one's first priority and 
USAREC is closed, there is no one to fix it.  
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This all being said, the FOIA process was still a useful and fruitful endeavor, at 
the very least from the perspective of experience and insight into the process more 
generally. FOIA requests are never easy, even in the best of times, so that the process 
worked as well as it did is some ways remarkable. In situations such as these, there is 
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